



Meeting of the

# Tower Hamlets Council

## Supplemental Agenda

**Wednesday, 20 November 2024 at 7.00 p.m.**

### **VENUE**

Council Chamber,  
Whitechapel Town Hall  
160 Whitechapel Road,  
London E1 1BJ

**Further information about this meeting is available in the main agenda.**

### **Democratic Services Contact:**

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# London Borough of Tower Hamlets

## Council



### Supplemental Agenda

Wednesday, 20 November 2024

7.00 p.m.

- 10 .1 Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report - Tower Hamlets Response 3 - 12**  
Appendix to the report.



Appendix 1 GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY: PHASE 2 DRAFT RESPONSE PLAN

<b>Key</b>
<b>Direct Impact LA</b>
<b>Indirect Impact for LA</b>
<b>Limited Indirect or no Impact for LA</b>

Item	Theme	Recommendation	Leading Service	Details of the recommendations	Position statement. Where we are as a council, at this point in time. Work already underway and future plans.
113.6	<b>Regulation</b>	That the government draw together under a <b>single regulator</b> all the functions relating to the construction industry to which we have referred	Building Control / Housing Management	Such a construction regulator would have sufficient resources to take on the following functions, (most of which currently discharged by other bodies). For example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the issue of compliance certificates for construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards.</li> <li>the regulation and oversight of building control.</li> <li>the licensing of contractors to work on higher risk buildings.</li> <li>monitoring the operation of the Building Regulations and the statutory guidance and advising the Secretary of State on the need for change.</li> <li>carrying out research on matters affecting fire safety in the built environment.</li> <li>collecting information on matters affecting fire safety (domestically and abroad)</li> <li>maintaining a publicly available library of test data and publications.</li> </ul>	<p>We welcome a more holistic regulatory framework for the construction industry.</p> <p>The new Regulator would have wider powers than the current Building Safety Regulatory.</p> <p>The Building Safety Regulator already has regulation and oversight of the Building Control elements of the construction process. This has been in place since October 2023,</p> <p>Competency Standards have already been enforced within the council with only Level 3 Inspectors working on high-risk buildings since April 2024.</p> <p>The council currently have four competency proven Level 3 Inspectors and 2 Level 4 Inspectors.</p> <p>Recruitment is a constant.</p>
113.7	<b>Regulation</b>	That the definition of a higher risk building for the purposes of the Building Safety Act be reviewed urgently.	Housing Management / Building Control	Defining buildings as “higher risk” by reference to height alone is unsatisfactory, being essentially arbitrary in nature. Building Safety Act 2022, sections 31 and 65. More relevant is the nature of its use, and particularly the likely presence of vulnerable people, for whom evacuation in the event of a fire or other emergency would be likely to present difficulty. Lowering of threshold, while increasing due diligence and safety will increase number of homes classified as high risk – e.g. council homes requiring mitigation and number of private blocks requiring council stewardship re: mitigation. It could be that certain types of building such as care homes, supported housing, temporary housing and buildings with high numbers of children could potentially be brought in scope, drastically increasing the number of buildings in the higher risk category.	<p>As a landlord of residential homes, we carry out Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPS) for vulnerable residents.</p> <p>PEEPS are an essential part of managing a building and keeping residents safe</p> <p>PEEPS are regularly reviewed.</p> <p>Widening the definition of a high-risk building to capture other types of residential homes, for example homes of varying height, will require extra resources.</p>
113.8	<b>Government</b>	That the government bring responsibility for the functions relating to fire safety currently exercised by MHCLG, the Home Office and the Department for Business and Trade into one department under a single Secretary of State.	Building Control	If a single body were responsible for all aspects of regulating matters affecting fire safety in the construction industry, that body should report to a single Secretary of State answerable to Parliament for all aspects of fire safety. That should improve the quality of government by providing an administrative environment in which information can be shared more quickly and more effectively between teams responsible for different aspects of the work and facilitate communication between the regulator and the department. It should also ensure that greater emphasis is placed on ensuring the safety of the built environment and that policy is developed in a holistic and coherent way.	A single government department or body for all aspects of regulating matters affecting fire safety in the construction industry needs to consider the role of New Products Ombudsman, Environmental Health under DEFRA and Highways & Civil engineering under Department of Transport; all of which interact with Building Control requirements.

113.9	<b>Chief Construction Adviser</b>	That the Secretary of State appoint a <b>Chief Construction Adviser</b> with a sufficient budget and staff to provide advice on all matters affecting the construction industry,	Building Control / (Housing Management)	Including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• monitoring all aspects of the department's work relating to the Building Regulations and statutory guidance.</li> <li>• providing advice to the Secretary of State on request.</li> <li>• bringing to the attention of the Secretary of State any matters affecting the Building Regulations and statutory guidance or matters affecting the construction industry more generally of which the government should be aware</li> </ul>	We welcome a senior advisory role that will enable matters to be escalated.
113.11	<b>Legislation and Guidance</b>	That the statutory guidance generally, and Approved Document B in particular, be reviewed accordingly and a revised version published as soon as possible	Building Control / Legal, (Housing Management)	The way in which the statutory guidance in Approved Document B was expressed was unsatisfactory in a number of respects. Considered that Approved Document B does not provide the information needed to design buildings that are safe in fire. Approved Document B needs to be reviewed as a matter of urgency, taking into account the expert evidence. It must then be kept under continuous review, together with the other 34 Approved Documents, and amended annually or promptly whenever developments in materials or building methods make that desirable. It should be drafted conservatively to ensure, as far as possible, that compliance with it will provide a high degree of confidence that on completion of the work the building will comply with the Building Regulations.	Approved documents should be kept under continuous review to reflect changes in how buildings are constructed and new materials.  Any changes to Approved Document B will require training of relevant council staff. This will have resource implications.
113.12	<b>Legislation and Guidance</b>	That a revised version of the guidance contains a clear warning in each section that the legal requirements are contained in the Building Regulations and that compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with them.	Building Control / (Housing Management)	The levels of competence in the construction industry are generally low and that by the time of the Grenfell Tower fire many contractors, designers and building control officers treated the statutory guidance as containing a definitive statement of the legal requirements.	While Approved Documents, British Standards and Codes of Practice provide guidance for designers, it is compliance with the requirements that ensures safe standards are achieved.  We welcome the focus made on compliance.
113.13	<b>Legislation and Guidance</b>	New materials and methods of construction and the practice of over cladding existing buildings make the existence of effective compartmentation a questionable assumption and <i>we recommend</i> that it be reconsidered when Approved Document B is revised.	Building Control / Trading Standards	We do not think it appropriate for us to recommend specific changes to Approved Document B, save in one respect. As we have pointed out in Chapter 48, the guidance proceeds on the assumption that effective compartmentation renders a stay put strategy an appropriate response to a fire in a flat in a high-rise residential building.	We welcome greater emphasis on compartmentalisation in Approved Documents.
113.13	<b>Legislation and Guidance</b>	That the guidance (Approved Document B) draws attention to the need to make a calculation of that kind. It is one that ought to form an essential part of any fire safety strategy	Building Control / Capital Delivery / Housing Management	In order to ensure the safety of occupants, including any with physical or mental impairments, those who design high-rise buildings need to be aware of the relationship between the rate at which fire is likely to spread through the external walls and the time required to evacuate the building or the relevant parts of it. A stay put strategy in response to a compartment fire will be acceptable only if there is negligible risk of fire escaping into and spreading through the external wall. Calculating the likely rate of fire spread and the time required for evacuation, including the evacuation of those with physical or mental impairments, are matters for a qualified fire engineer. We do not think that it would be helpful to attempt to include in Approved Document B an indication of what would be acceptable because each building is different.	A fire safety strategy for a residential building sets out if a 'stay put' plan or 'simultaneous evacuation' plan is in place.  Fire spread and compartmentalisation form part of that strategy.  We complete fire safety strategies for council new build.
113.14	<b>Legislation and Guidance</b>	That, as far as possible, membership of bodies advising on changes to the statutory guidance should include representatives of the <i>academic community</i> as well as those with <i>practical experience</i> of the industry (including fire engineers) chosen for their experience and skill and should extend beyond those who have served on similar bodies in the past	Building Control	We think that a fresh approach needs to be taken to reviewing and revising the Building Regulations and statutory guidance that is driven primarily by considerations of safety. Fresh minds are needed.	We will take up opportunities to engage with regional and national industry bodies on consultations to improve compliance and keep residents safe.  We will diversify those invited to council led housing/building events to include 'fresh minds' for example from the university sector.
113.15	<b>Fire safety strategy</b>	That it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer (see below) to be submitted with building control applications (at Gateway 2) for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and re-submitted at the stage of completion	Building Control / (housing management)	Those involved in the design and execution of the Grenfell Tower refurbishment failed to understand properly the need for a fire safety strategy and therefore failed to ensure that a final version of the Outline Fire Safety Strategy begun by Exova was completed. That allowed the building to be in a dangerous condition on completion. In order to avoid a repeat of that error, we consider that there is a compelling case for requiring a fire safety strategy to be produced as a condition of obtaining building control approval	See 111.13  We welcome the proposal to make a fire safety strategy part of the building control approval process.

		(Gateway 3). Such a strategy must take into account the needs of vulnerable people, including the additional time they may require leaving the building or reach a place of safety within it and any additional facilities necessary to ensure their safety.		for the construction or refurbishment of any higher-risk building and for it to be reviewed and approved on completion.	If agreed this will require training for Building Control staff.
113.17	<b>Fire Performance Tests</b>	That steps be taken in conjunction with the professional and academic community to develop new test methods that will provide the information needed for such assessments to be carried out reliably	Building Control	From the experiments conducted by Professor Bisby and Professor Torero for Phase 2 of our investigations, the factors that affect the way in which fire spreads over ventilated rainscreen external wall systems are complex and understanding them is an evolving science. Intuitive judgements are often wrong because a small change in the system can have a significant effect on the outcome.	Continuous training for Building Control staff is essential to remain current on evolving fire considerations.  The service continuously updates staff with industry advancements and discoveries.
113.18	<b>Fire Performance Tests</b>	That the government make it clear that it should not be used as a substitute for an assessment by a suitably qualified fire engineer.	Building Control	In light of Professor Torero's evidence, [the inquiry authors] think that BS 9414 will encourage people who are not trained fire engineers to think that they can safely assess the performance of a proposed external wall system by extrapolation from information obtained from tests on one or more different systems.	Building Control staff are fully aware of the concerns regarding the use of BS9414 .  We have reiterated the need for an experienced Fire Engineer assessment and not to attempt to interpret.
113.22	<b>Certification of products and publication of test data</b>	That the construction regulator should be responsible for assessing the conformity of construction products with the requirements of legislation, statutory guidance and industry standards and issuing certificates as appropriate. We should expect such certificates to become pre-eminent in the market.	Building Control	The certification bodies that provided assurance to the market of the quality and characteristics of the products failed to ensure that the statements in the certificates they issued were accurate and based on appropriate and relevant test evidence. The United Kingdom Assessment Service (UKAS), the organisation charged with accrediting them, failed to apply proper standards of monitoring and supervision. Conformity assessment bodies provide a commercial service combined with an element of regulation, but the two functions do not sit easily together. Pressure to acquire and retain customers can all too easily lead such bodies to be less rigorous in their examination of products and materials and enforcing their terms of contracts than could reasonably be expected of bodies acting in the public interest.	We do not employ testing laboratories; testing is carried out by the manufacturers to prove the use of materials. Due diligence is required of the building owners when choosing these materials  Ensuring testing laboratories are responsible to the Construction Regulator would remove the commercial interest which is alluded to in the Inquiry recommendation.
Page 5 113.23	<b>Certification of products and publication of test data</b>	Clarity is required to avoid those who rely on certificates of conformity being misled. <i>We therefore recommend:</i> a. that copies of all test results supporting any certificate issued by the construction regulator be included in the certificate. b. that manufacturers be required to provide the construction regulator with the full testing history of the product or material to which the certificate relates and inform the regulator of any material circumstances that may affect its performance. c. and manufacturers be required by law to provide on request copies of all test results that support claims about fire performance made for their products	Building Control	Clarity is required to avoid those who rely on certificates of conformity being misled.	We welcome this additional scrutiny.  There will be resources implications if every Completion Certificate must attach all the supporting certification and for these to be reviewed.
113.25	<b>Fire engineers</b>	That the profession of fire engineer be recognised and protected by law and that an independent body be established to regulate the profession, define the standards required for membership, maintain a register of members and regulate their conduct	N/A	Unfortunately, the term "fire engineer" does not at present denote any formal qualification and as a result it is possible for a person to practise as a fire engineer without any formal qualification. think that the profession of fire engineer should be formally recognised and that both the title and the function should be protected by statute. Over time that would create a body of registered fire engineers who are capable of contributing to the design and delivery of safe buildings and of educating those construction professionals with whom they work in effective fire safety strategies.	N/A
113.25	<b>Fire engineers</b>	In order to speed up the creation of a body of professional fire engineers <i>we also recommend</i> that the government take urgent steps to increase the number of places on high-quality master's level courses in fire engineering accredited by the professional regulator	N/A	Fire safety is a skill the inquiry considers to be acquired 'only by specialised education and experience worth of formal recognition.'	N/A
113.27	<b>Fire engineers</b>	That the government convene a group of practitioner and academic fire engineers and such other professionals as it thinks fit to <i>produce an authoritative</i>	N/A	Such a statement would also enable others in the construction industry to understand better the nature and importance of a fire engineer's work. We think it would be of benefit to those carrying out this work to have regard to the reports of the Warren Centre, to which we refer in Chapter 112	N/A

		statement of the knowledge and skills to be expected of a competent fire engineer			
113.28	<b>Fire engineers</b>	That the government, working in collaboration with industry and professional bodies, encourage the development of courses in the principles of fire engineering for construction professionals and members of the fire and rescue services as part of their continuing professional development	N/A		N/A
113.30	<b>Architects</b>	That they should review the changes already made to ensure they are sufficient in the light of our findings	N/A	The Architects Registration Board and the Royal Institute of British Architects have taken steps since the Grenfell Tower fire to improve the education and training of architects	
113.31	<b>Architects</b>	That it be made a statutory requirement that an application for building control approval in relation to the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a statement from a senior manager of the principal designer under the Building Safety Act 2022 that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion the building as designed will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.	Building Control / (Housing Management)	Regrettably, the work of Studio E on the Grenfell Tower refurbishment fell significantly below the standard reasonably to be expected of it in a number of significant ways, in particular, in failing to exercise proper care in relation to the choice of insulation and rainscreen panels. The evidence, not least the fact that similar materials have since been found on hundreds of other high-rise buildings, suggests that there may be a widespread failure among the profession to investigate properly or understand the nature of the materials being chosen for that purpose.	We welcome making this declaration a statutory requirement.  We operate a rigorous approach and for council new build residential projects, the Principal Designer must submit a signed statement that all reasonable steps have been taken to ensure that on completion of the works, as designed, the building will be safe.  The golden thread and change control plan should ensure that materials are not substituted, if they are it should be fully documented and reviewed.
113.33	<b>Contractors</b>	That a licensing scheme operated by the construction regulator be introduced for principal contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings and that it be a legal requirement that any application for building control approval for the construction or refurbishment of a higher-risk building (Gateway 2) be supported by a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor to take all reasonable care to ensure that on completion and handover the building is as safe as is required by the Building Regulations.	Building Control / Housing Regeneration / Housing Management	The design and build form of contract (now very widely used), makes the principal contractor responsible for the whole range of activities relating to the work, even though it invariably engages sub-contractors to carry out different aspects of it. include a failure to make it clear which contractor was responsible for particular aspects of the design and a failure to take an active interest in fire safety. The construction industry as a whole needs to become technically more competent and less willing to sacrifice quality to speed and cost. That would ensure that those working on the most sensitive buildings are qualified by experience and organisation to do so and such a system should lead to a general increase in competence among contractors.	We welcome a licensing scheme and its focus on competency assessments and those competency assessments be part of the Building Control approval process.
113.37	<b>Building control</b>	That the government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process	Building Control	Many of those involved in major construction projects (clients, contractors, architects) regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance. It was even described as an extension of the design team. In many cases that was how building control itself saw its role. That was a serious misunderstanding, but it was fostered by building control bodies themselves, who preferred to co-operate with applicants to enable proposals to be approved rather than enforce the Building Regulations rigorously. The government has taken steps to improve the regulation of building control and the competence of those who consider applications for approval. We expect the construction regulator to continue these new arrangements, which are intended to introduce a wholly new climate in which both applicants for approval and building control officers understand that the function of building control is regulatory in nature. One of the causes of the inappropriate relationship to which we have referred was the introduction into the system of commercial interests. Approved inspectors had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest. Competition for work between approved inspectors and local authority building control departments introduced a similar conflict of interest affecting them. As things stand that underlying conflict of interest will continue to exist and will continue to threaten the integrity of the system.	We will engage in the government consultation on this matter.

113.38	<b>Building control</b>	That the same panel consider whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.	Building Control	The shortcomings we have identified in local authority building control suggest that in the interests of professionalism and consistency of service all building control functions, including those currently performed by local authorities, should be exercised nationally.	We will engage with the government consultation on this matter.
113.39	<b>A construction library</b>	That the construction regulator sponsors the development of a similar library, perhaps as part of a joint project with the University of Queensland, to provide a continuing resource for designers.	Building Control	Those who design buildings, particularly higher-risk and complex buildings, would benefit from having access to a body of information, such as data from tests on products and materials, reports on serious fires and academic papers. In Chapter 112 we have referred to the Cladding Materials Library set up by the University of Queensland, which could form the basis of a valuable source of information for designers of buildings in general.	We welcome an open library.
113.40	<b>Response to recommendations</b>	That it be made a legal requirement for the government to maintain a publicly accessible record of recommendations made by select committees, coroners and public inquiries together with a description of the steps taken in response. If the government decides not to accept a recommendation, it should record its reasons for doing so. Scrutiny of its actions should be a matter for Parliament, to which it should be required to report annually.	N/A	<b>Some important recommendations affecting fire safety were ignored by the government in the years leading up to the Grenfell Tower fire. Recommendations made by the Select Committee in 1999 were not implemented and the department's response to the recommendations made by the Lakanal House coroner was inadequate. The department had no system for recording recommendations made by public bodies or keeping track of its response to them. That was obviously unsatisfactory.</b>	
113.41	<b>Fire risk assessors</b>	That the government establish a system of mandatory accreditation to certify the competence of fire risk assessors by setting standards for qualification and continuing professional development and such other measures as may be considered necessary or desirable. We think it necessary for an accreditation system to be mandatory in order to ensure the competence of all those who offer their services as fire risk assessors	Housing Management/ Health and Safety	Concern has been expressed for many years about the competence of some of those offering their services as commercial fire risk assessors and the absence of any scheme of regulation to ensure that responsible persons under the Fire Safety Order can have confidence in the skill and experience of those whom they instruct to carry out fire risk assessments on their behalf.	All Fire Risk Assessments carried out on council residential buildings follow the PAS79 standard; this is a requirement in the procurement of Fire Risk Assessments from third parties.  Future procurement will be updated to include additional competencies as required.
113.43	<b>Fire control switches in lifts</b>	That the government seeks urgent advice from the Building Safety Regulator and the National Fire Chiefs Council on the nature and scale of the problem and the appropriate response to it.	Housing Management/Health and Safety	At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire there was a significant variation in the dimensions of drop keys available from commercial suppliers, not all of which were compatible with all fire control switches.  Although drop keys for the use of firefighters are provided by fire and rescue services, firefighters commonly obtain their own from a variety of sources.  It appears to have been largely a matter of chance whether the key carried by the first firefighter who tried to take control of a lift was capable of operating the switch. That is clearly unacceptable and may result in unnecessary casualties, as it did at Grenfell Tower	We will investigate with the LFB a single alternative to drop keys at block entrances and lifts. There are several more secure systems released to the market.
113.44	<b>Pipeline isolation valves</b>	That every gas transporter be required by law to check the accessibility of each such valve on its system at least once every three years and to report the results of that inspection to the Health and Safety Executive as part of its gas safety case review.	Housing Management / (Public Realm)	At the time of the fire at Grenfell Tower the valves could not be operated because they had been covered over in the course of hard landscaping. There was evidence that it was a common problem in the industry for pipeline isolation valves to be lost in that way. In our view that poses an unacceptable risk to health and safety and could have significant consequences.	We have a programme of laser scanning of council 18M+ residential building. We will make sure that the location of these valves has been included in this scanning programme and will add retrospectively if need be.
113.51	<b>A College of Fire and Rescue</b>	That the government establish such a college immediately with sufficient resources to provide the following services nationally: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. practical training at all levels supplementary to that provided by individual fire and rescue services.</li> <li>b. education in the form of lectures and seminars on different aspects of the work of the fire and rescue services in order to share experience and promote good practice.</li> <li>c. research into matters that may affect the work of the fire and rescue services, including major fires.</li> </ul>	N/A	Although the National Fire Chiefs Council provides a forum for discussions and the formulation of policy, there is currently no central body that is equipped to provide education and training across the board to nationally approved standards.  The constitution of the College of Fire and Rescue is a matter for the government in consultation with the National Fire Chiefs Council and other interested bodies, but it could be established as a not-for-profit company, independent of the government, with a board of directors drawn from a range of backgrounds, a significant proportion of whom are currently serving Chief Fire Officers or senior officers with significant firefighting experience.	N/A

		<p>d. the development of equipment, policies and procedures suitable for ensuring the effectiveness of fire and rescue services nationally and the safety of firefighters and the public.</p> <p>e. setting and maintaining national standards of managerial competence for senior managers, including control room managers, and providing management training for, and regular assessment of, senior ranks by reference to such standards.</p> <p>f.</p>			
113.53	<b>A College of Fire and Rescue</b>	Although it is for the government to decide how the college should be constituted, <i>we recommend that</i> it should have a permanent staff of sufficient size to manage its operations and develop its functions in response to the demands of fire and rescue services nationally and the requirements of the board. The college will need access to permanent facilities, including facilities for practical training and education. We envisage that much of the training and education will be delivered and led by firefighters of suitable experience drawn as the occasion requires from fire and rescue services around the country	N/A		N/A
113.55	<b>The Control Room</b>	In the meantime, we recommend that His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services ("the Inspectorate") inspect the LFB as soon as reasonably possible to assess and report on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. the extent to which the control room is now integrated into the organisation.</li> <li>b. the effectiveness of the arrangements for identifying the training needs of control room staff, delivering effective training and recording its outcomes.</li> <li>c. the effectiveness of the control room generally.</li> <li>d. the ability of the control room to handle a large number of concurrent requests for advice and assistance from people directly affected by fires or other emergencies; and</li> <li>e. the quality and effectiveness of the arrangements for communication between the control room and the incident commander</li> </ul>	N/A	The control room should be at the heart of any fire and rescue service and should, therefore, be recognised as a key part of the organisation and fully integrated into it. Its staff must be trained to handle whatever demands are reasonably foreseeable	N/A
113.56	<b>Incident commanders</b>	That as soon as reasonably possible the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on the arrangements it has in place for assessing the training of incident commanders at all levels and their continuing competence, whether by a process of revalidation or otherwise	N/A	In Chapter 72 [the authors] are critical of the LFB's arrangements immediately before the Grenfell Tower fire for assessing the competence of those expected to act as incident commanders, particularly in the early stages of the response to a fire in a high-rise residential building. Steps have already been taken to respond to the criticisms made by the chair in his Phase 1 report, but in order to reassure those who live in London	N/A
113.57	<b>Operational planning</b>	That as soon as reasonably practicable the Inspectorate inspect the LFB to examine and report on its arrangements for collecting, storing and distributing information in accordance with section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, and in particular its arrangements for identifying high-risk residential buildings and collecting, storing and distributing information relating to them	Housing Management/Health and Safety	In the years before the Grenfell Tower fire the LFB consistently failed to implement an effective system for the collection, storage and distribution of operational risk information, in particular in relation to high-risk, high-rise residential buildings	We will seek to improve the quality of information within the Premises Information Box aiming to ensure full compliance with NFCC guidance by September 2025
113.58	<b>Implementing change</b>	That the LFB establish effective standing arrangements for collecting, considering and effectively <i>implementing lessons learned from previous incidents, inquests and investigations</i> . Those arrangements should be as simple as possible, flexible and of a kind that will ensure that any appropriate changes in practice or procedure are implemented speedily	Building control / Civil Protection Unit (CPU) / Housing Management	LFB's eventual reporting on lessons learned and streamlining of bureaucratic processes here may have implications for LA's- reports containing this information may be of use for officers working in fire safety, housing, planning etc.	We have a learning culture.  We review any lessons learned from the LFB or any other relevant body and consider if it is relevant to a local authority and how we can learn from these.



					<p>An officer fire risk group considers new guidance as well learning from fires and near misses which occur within our council housing stock.</p> <p>The CPU ensure that following a significant incident a debrief is held to capture learning, such as Nida House &amp; Bentworth Court incidents. Processes are then updated to reflect learning such as, a permanent standby Emergency Centre Manager has been added to our Standby Resilience Team Rota.</p>
113.59	<b>Communications</b>	That fire and rescue services that continue to use low power intrinsically safe radios as part of breathing apparatus consider reserving them only for situations in which there is a real risk of igniting flammable gases and generally using radios of higher power, particularly in high-rise buildings.	N/A	<p>Communication by radio is inherently likely to be adversely affected in certain environments, including tall buildings constructed mainly of dense or reflective materials.</p> <p>Intrinsically safe radios capable of operating at higher power are now available</p>	N/A
113.60	<b>Communications</b>	That all fire and rescue services give consideration to providing all firefighters with digital radios	N/A	There is strong evidence that in general digital radios are more effective than analogue radios.	N/A
113.61	<b>Communications</b>	That firefighters be trained to respond appropriately to the loss of communications and to understand how to restore them	N/A	Radio communications are inherently unreliable in certain environments	N/A
113.62	<b>Water</b>	That basic training on the structure and operation of the water supply system, including the different types of hydrants in use and their functions, be given to all firefighters. Training should also be given on effective measures to increase water flow and pressure when necessary	N/A	On the night of the Grenfell Tower fire firefighters were unable to distinguish between different types of hydrants. That is a clear indication of a need for better training.	N/A
113.63	<b>Water</b>	That all fire and rescue services establish and periodically review an agreed protocol with the statutory water undertakers in their areas to enable effective communication between them in relation to the supply of water for firefighting purposes.	N/A	The Grenfell Tower fire made unusual demands on the supply of water, but other major fires may make similar demands in future. If it becomes necessary to seek the assistance of the statutory water undertaker to increase the volume or pressure of the supply, the fire and rescue service should be able to communicate with it quickly and clearly.	N/A
113.64	<b>Water</b>	That the British Standards Institution amend BS 750 to include a description of the circumstances under which the flow coefficient to which it refers in paragraph 10.2 is to be measured	N/A	In paragraph 81.23 of Chapter 81 [the authors] considered British Standard 750:2002 relating to the flow coefficient of fire hydrants and noted that the standard does not state whether the figure stated in paragraph 10.2 relates to a simple hydrant tested under factory conditions or to a hydrant installed in the pipework necessary to connect it to the water network. Any confusion could easily be dispelled by a small amendment to the standard.	N/A
113.65	<b>Deployment of firefighters</b>	We cannot tell whether in any of those cases they would have been able to rescue people higher up the building if they had not done so, but <i>we recommend</i> that National Fire Chiefs Council consider whether, and if so in what circumstances, firefighters should be discouraged from departing from their instructions on their own initiative and provide appropriate training in how to respond to a situation of that kind.	N/A	How to deploy the available firefighters must remain the responsibility of the incident commander, who alone can judge how best to make use of the available resources. [The authors] also recognise that firefighters must be allowed to exercise discretion in how best to carry out their instructions. However, anyone reading Part 9 of the report will be struck by the number of times crews despatched to the highest floors of the tower in response to calls for assistance failed to reach their destinations because they decided to help people they encountered on the stairs on their way up.	N/A
113.67	<b>Civil Contingencies Act 2004</b>	The Act be reviewed, and consideration be given to granting a designated Secretary of State the power to carry out the functions of a Category 1 responder in its place for a limited period of time.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	The government's powers in sections 5 and 7 of the Act to intervene in response to an emergency are far-reaching but they do not enable it to intervene promptly or decisively when a Category 1 responder is failing to rise to the challenge.	The CPU will ensure any change to the Civil Contingency Act will be reflected in planning arrangements for managing emergencies.
113.68	<b>Civil Contingencies Act 2004</b>	That the regulation be amended to require Category 1 responders to establish and maintain partnerships with the voluntary, community and faith organisations in the areas in which they are responsible for preparing for and responding to emergencies	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	The response of local voluntary organisations to the disaster demonstrated their capacity to act as valuable partners in responding to an emergency. Regulation 23 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 requires a Category 1 responder to have regard when making its plans to the activities of relevant voluntary organisations.	The CPU maintain relationships with key voluntary sector organisations such as British Red Cross, Islamic Relief, REACT, VCTH, St John Ambulance who all form part of the Borough Resilience Forum. The CPU continue to work with the Senior VCS Development Officer to further enhance relationships with more localised voluntary organisations

113.69	<b>Guidance</b>	That the guidance be revised, reduced in length and consolidated in one document which lays greater emphasis on the need for those leading the response to consider the requirements for recovery, the need to identify vulnerable people, the importance of identifying and ensuring co-operation with voluntary, community and faith groups and is consistent with the Equality Act 2010.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	The current guidance on preparing for emergencies is contained in several documents, all of which are unduly long and, in some respects, out of date.	The CPU are aware of the UK Government Framework and the 3 core principals to effective resilience planning; 1. A developed and shared understanding of the civil contingencies' risks (underpinning everything that we do)  2. To prepare for and recover from crises, prevention wherever possible (putting resilience at the heart of our decision making and investment), and  3. Resilience is a 'whole of society' endeavour (be more transparent and empower everyone to contribute).  The CPU will ensure any updated versions are shared & embedded into the council emergency arrangements.
113.69	<b>Guidance</b>	That regard for humanitarian considerations be expressly recognised by making it the ninth principle of effective response and recover	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)		The CPU maintains and embeds a Humanitarian Assistance Plan to ensure impacted residents are supported throughout response and recovery,
113.70	<b>London Local Authority Gold arrangements</b>	That the guidance on the operation of those arrangements be revised and that existing and newly appointed chief executives be given regular training to ensure they are familiar with its principles	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	Although each London borough is a separate Category 1 responder, there are arrangements for promoting resilience across the capital as a whole, in particular through the London Local Authority Gold arrangements. Events demonstrated, however, that there is a need for a clearer understanding of the nature of the London Gold arrangements, in particular in situations in which a single borough is affected.	Arrangements for managing civil emergencies need to be continuously reviewed as all emergency situations are unique.
113.71	<b>Local resilience forums</b>	That local resilience forums adopt national standards to ensure effective training, preparation and planning for emergencies and adopt independent auditing schemes to identify deficiencies and secure compliance.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	Our investigations revealed the inability of the London Resilience Forum to monitor the quality of its members' planning, training and preparation for responding to emergencies. Neither Minimum Standards for London, which applied at the time, nor its replacement, Resilience Standards for London, gave the local resilience forum any means of securing compliance with the standards they prescribed. We note that in the Resilience Framework the government has recognised the need to strengthen local resilience forums.	The BRF meet quarterly and currently is chaired by the Civil Protection & and Business Continuity Manager.  All London boroughs host Borough Resilience Forums (BRF) as a part of their resilience arrangements. BRF's are attended by other category one & two organisations such as the emergency services, Environment Agency, Transport providers, local NHS Trusts & EPRR, voluntary sector and other key partners such as Canary Wharf Group, local universities and housing providers.  The Borough Resilience Forum maintains a Multi-Agency Risk Register and regularly discusses and updates the control measures of High and Very High Risks.
113.71	<b>Local resilience forums</b>	That a mechanism be introduced for independently verifying the frequency and quality of training provided by local authorities and other Category 1 responders	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	Our investigations revealed the inability of the London Resilience Forum to monitor the quality of its members' planning, training and preparation for responding to emergencies. Neither Minimum Standards for London, which applied at the time, nor its replacement, Resilience Standards for London, gave the local resilience forum any means of securing compliance with the standards they prescribed. We note that in the Resilience Framework the government has recognised the need to strengthen local resilience forums.	BRF members regularly update members on exercising & training opportunities for cross organisational learning.  The CPU offers local authority training which has been taken up by some members, CPU will continue to promote such opportunities.
113.73	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That local authorities train all their employees, including chief executives, to regard resilience as an integral part of their responsibilities	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	The failure of The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) to meet the basic needs of those displaced in the days immediately following the fire demonstrated the need for local authorities to have effective plans in place for providing humanitarian assistance. It also emphasised the need for those plans to be supported by a qualified humanitarian assistance liaison officer (HALO) and for there to be regular practice in putting them into effect. There is scope for all those required to respond to emergencies to learn from each other's experience and promote best practice. RBKC was not able to provide an effective response to the emergency because it had not made adequate	We expect all Directors & Heads of Service to attend the LRU training to understand local authority arrangements in emergencies. Throughout 2024, Seventy-two have been trained to date.  All Corporate Directors/Directors should attend Emergency Planning College 2-day Strategic

				arrangements for staffing the emergency communication centre, had not made adequate provision for humanitarian assistance, including the provision of accommodation and financial support, did not have the ability to keep accurate records of those who needed help and had no effective system for communicating with the public.	Emergency management Course, eight have now received the training.  All appointed HALOs attend the LRU facilitated HALO training.
113.74	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That all local authorities devise methods of obtaining and recording information of that kind, if possible, in electronic form, and practise putting them into operation under a variety of different circumstances.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	RBKC had no effective means of collecting and recording information about those who had been displaced from the tower and surrounding buildings, including those who were missing. Compiling reliable information of that kind is difficult and the challenges likely to be faced by local authority Category 1 responders will vary according to the nature of the emergency.	The CPU has an Electronic Registration Form via MS Forms/Lists. Training has been provided and its use tested during exercises such as Exercise Lemongrass and Exercise Mercury. Further testing of this with colleagues in Housing Management & Facilities Management will take place; so, functionality can be tested further.
113.75	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That all local authorities make such arrangements as are reasonably practicable for enabling them to place people in temporary accommodation at short notice and in ways that meet their personal, religious and cultural requirements. Such arrangements should, as far as possible, involve local providers of social housing	Civil Protection Unit (CPU) / Housing Options	Any local authority is likely to have difficulty finding temporary accommodation for a very large number of displaced persons but the need to do so should be recognised and contingency plans drawn up.	The CPU hold Corporate Credit Cards to be agile in purchasing accommodation and other support needs in an emergency.  The transaction limits are under review to ensure that they can accommodate unusually high levels of expenditure that would be needed to support a major incident.  Business Accounts are already held with commercial hotels to enable rapid procurement of accommodation
113.76	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That all local authorities include in their contingency plans arrangements for providing immediate financial assistance to people affected by an emergency	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)/Housing Management	Effective humanitarian assistance is vital in ensuring that those who are most affected by an emergency are treated with dignity and respect and do not suffer additional trauma as a result of an inability to take control of their situation. In the case of the response to the Grenfell Tower fire three matters caused particular resentment: the circumstances surrounding some of the temporary accommodation, the difficulty in obtaining financial support in the days immediately following the fire and breakdowns in the support provided by key workers. Problems arising from the provision of suitable temporary accommodation may be difficult to resolve but other complaints should be easier to avoid by careful planning.	See above 113.75.  Cash assistance schemes are in place when residents are displaced and in need of financial assistance. These schemes are operated by CPU and by housing management.  These will be reviewed given the concerns raised in this Inquiry report.
113.76	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That as part of their planning for emergencies local authorities give detailed consideration to the availability of key workers and the role, they are expected to play so that suitable contingency arrangements can be made to ensure, as far as possible, continuity of support.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)	See above	The London Resilience Unit have produced a Key Workers Framework to support local authorities in this area. We propose to embed this framework into the council emergency arrangements,
113.77	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That as part of their emergency planning local authorities make effective arrangements for continuing communication with those who need assistance using the most suitable technology and a range of languages appropriate to the area	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)/ Communications	One important aspect of humanitarian assistance that was absent following the Grenfell Tower fire was regular communication between those providing assistance and those in need of it. For example, too many people who had been found temporary accommodation felt that they had then been left on their own, not knowing for how long they were expected to remain or on what terms and without anyone to turn to provide that information. That gave rise to a sense of isolation and powerlessness.	The Crisis Communications Plan sets out the main communication channels for incidents.  Business Continuity Plans held in individual services such as in housing management will hold details of communication channels that will be used to keep residents informed.  All such plans undergo review following incidents and lessons learnt; did our channels work, could we have communicated better?
113.78	<b>Local Authorities</b>	That all local authorities include in their plans for responding to emergencies arrangements for providing information to the public by whatever combination of modern methods of communication are likely to be most effective for the areas for which they are responsible.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)/ Communications	It is also important not to lose sight of those who, although not physically affected by an emergency, may be worried about the safety of friends or relations caught up in it. Again, effective communication is essential.	See above 113.77

113.78	<b>Local Authorities</b>	In future, to avoid confusion, wasted effort and frustration <i>we also recommend that</i> what in the past has been called by the police a “casualty bureau” be described in a way that makes it clear that it does not provide information to the public about people affected by the emergency	Civil Protection Unit (CPU) Communications		We will adopt better signage and communication when incidents arise to remove misleading terminology.
113.82	<b>Vulnerable people</b>	That further consideration be given to the recommendations made in the Phase 1 report (regarding the preparation of PEEPs) in the light of our findings in this report.	Civil Protection Unit (CPU)/ Housing Management	Phase 1 report recommended the owner and manager of every high-rise residential building be required by law to prepare personal emergency evacuation plans (PEEPs) for all residents whose ability to evacuate the building without assistance may be compromised (such as persons with reduced mobility or impaired cognition) and to include current information about them and their associated PEEPs in a premises information box. (Phase 1, Volume IV paragraph 33.22(e-f))	PEEPs are held by landlords.  CPU will ensure that the PEEPs are captured in the Community Care Plan and the term is understood by all responders
113.83	<b>Vulnerable people</b>	The advice contained in paragraph 79.11 of the LGA Guide on be reconsidered	Civil Protection Unit (CPU) / Housing Management	The considerations that led [the chairman of the report] to make those recommendations led us to investigate in Phase 2 why the LGA Guide advised landlords and responsible persons that it was usually unrealistic to plan for the evacuation and assistance in the event of a fire of disabled and vulnerable residents living in general needs blocks of flats, such as Grenfell Tower. <sup>17</sup> That led in turn to [the authors] making a number of criticisms of the government and to recommend that the advice in the LGA Guide be reconsidered.  Moreover, the further evidence that we have received in the course of Phase 2 has confirmed us in the view that the responsible person for a general needs residential building should collect sufficient information about vulnerable occupants to enable appropriate measures to be taken to assist their escape in the event of a fire.	PEEPs are held by the landlord.  When an incident arises, additional checks are made as part of the response process. For example, a Vulnerable Person Check which is carried out by the Senior Humanitarian Assistance Officer (SHAO) to identify any residents receiving an Adult/Children’s Social Care service. The check is done using council databases.  The information is shared with those responding to the incident.

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